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The growth of contingent employment from 1970 to the present has 
been met with a resounding silence about possible federal and state-
level public policy responses. This lack of response is not surprising 
since systematic public policy responses to changes in the labor force 
are diffi cult to enact in the United States due to the absence of a true 
national labor policy. There exists instead a fragmented system: federal 
legislation is implemented by the states, but the rules are interpreted by 
the courts. Policy responses therefore are limited by both U.S. federal-
ism and the autonomy of the states. (For one example see the detailed 
discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding the Social Security 
Act of 1935 in Haber and Murray [1966]). This cumbersome system 
often fails to keep pace with the needs of workers as labor market con-
ditions change. Current public policies governing contingent employ-
ment have arisen from the haphazard application of existing policies 
rather than the development of new policies designed to address the 
specifi c circumstances of contingent workers.
The policy diffi culties inherent in the system stem from the single-
minded aim of policymakers when the existing labor market policies 
were being developed: to provide protections for the benefi t of regu-
lar full-time workers. This focus was a historical accident because the 
workforce was primarily full time and male when the key U.S. labor 
policies such as unemployment insurance and the minimum wage were 
enacted in the 1930s. Policies that have an impact on nonstandard and 
contingent workers do so only because contingent workers are caught 
in the penumbrae of policies developed for full-time workers, not be-
cause policies have been developed specifi cally for the benefi t of con-
tingent workers. 
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Eligibility requirements are the key to understanding the impact 
of labor market policies on contingent workers. These requirements 
establish the rules by which an individual qualifi es for benefi ts. By 
specifying eligibility criteria, policymakers determine whom they want 
covered by the policy. Often the unintended consequence of these eli-
gibility requirements is to limit access to social insurance by minorities 
and women, who are disproportionately represented in the contingent 
workforce (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
There are essentially three ways in which a contingent worker 
may be deemed ineligible for coverage. Most commonly, the contin-
gent worker fails to meet the work-based requirements for eligibility. 
These requirements stipulate rules governing the hours worked, amount 
earned, or the distribution of earnings during the year. Those with full-
time jobs and those who earn more qualify for benefi ts, while those 
with part-time jobs or limited hours of work are deemed ineligible. A 
second factor determining ineligibility is employment in an industry or 
with a fi rm that is exempted from the legislation. There are numerous 
examples of farm workers and employees of small fi rms that are not 
covered by labor legislation. Finally, there are the gray areas of labor 
legislation where the courts have not yet decided whether the laws ap-
ply to certain types of workers. These gray areas have emerged in issues 
concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) discussed 
on p. 192 and employer-provided benefi ts such as pensions and stock 
options, as in Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation (May 12, 1999). 
When evaluating the impact of labor market policies, analysts use 
four criteria: 1) economic effi ciency, 2) equity, 3) security, and 4) lib-
erty. (For a complete discussion of these criteria, see Stone [1988]). 
Economic effi ciency is determined by evaluating the relationship be-
tween the increased coverage and its marginal cost. In this sense we can 
consider a policy effi cient if the most people are covered for the least 
cost. Equity means treating people in similar situations in the same way. 
Security is defi ned as providing benefi ts to those most at risk. However, 
economic effi ciency and security often will be at odds with one another. 
For example, providing health insurance to the most ill may improve 
security, but the extra cost is likely to be disproportionately high. Final-
ly, liberty examines when a policy intervention is justifi ed: when should 
a government impress a collective outcome on an individual? This is 
generally interpreted to mean that government should intervene during 
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those times when an individual’s actions adversely affect other people. 
One example is when an individual does not take into consideration the 
effects of auto emissions on others. In this case there is an opportunity 
for government action to correct this outcome.
For each of the public policies discussed in this chapter, eligibility 
rules are used as a starting point to examine the effi ciency and equity of 
the program. Eligibility rules determine whether contingent or nonstan-
dard workers are likely to be eligible and therefore covered (equity), 
and whether coverage can be expanded to include contingent work-
ers with only modest increases in cost (effi ciency). The likelihood that 
nonstandard workers will need the program (security) and the rationale 
for altering the eligibility criteria and coverage of these public policies 
(liberty) also are examined. 
The discussion is focused on those policies that affect individual 
workers directly: employer-provided benefi ts of health insurance and 
pensions, unemployment insurance, family and medical leave, mini-
mum wages, and occupational safety and health. Clearly this is not 
an exhaustive list of public policies affecting workers; however, these 
policies are representative of those that are likely to directly impact 
contingent and nonstandard employment relationships. 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED BENEFITS
Employer-provided benefi ts have recently been the subject of con-
siderable litigation and debate in the courts and state and federal legis-
latures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the widely publi-
cized case Vizcaino v. Microsoft that temporary employees were in fact 
“common law” employees of the Microsoft Corporation. Consequently, 
the court found that Microsoft had wrongly denied benefi ts worth mil-
lions of dollars to employees because they had been misclassifi ed as 
independent contractors or freelancers.
Legal challenges to the classifi cation of contingent workers have 
a long history. Part of the challenge of properly classifying employees 
results from the ambiguity of the tax status of these workers. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) has fi led a number of lawsuits in an effort 
to determine who is responsible for an employee’s payroll taxes. (For a 
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discussion of the legal relationship between temporary help employers 
and workers, see Parker [1994)]; Gonos [1997]; duRivage, Carré, and 
Tilley [1998]). The court also has made considerable headway in deter-
mining who is an “employee” and under what criteria the employer is 
responsible for enforcing a number of federal statutes. Carnevale, Jen-
nings, and Eisenmann (1998) have outlined many of the requirements 
necessary to be considered an employee (as opposed to a contractor 
or temporary worker). As discussed in Chapter 5, there are a number 
of multifactor legal tests for distinguishing between an employee and 
an independent contractor. One of the most important factors has been 
determining “the extent of the employer’s control and supervision over 
the worker, including directions on scheduling and performance of 
work” (p. 288). 
Health Insurance
Legislative changes extending employer-provided benefi ts to em-
ployees have been considerably more modest than legal rulings. Most 
changes have been concerned with maintaining worker access to health 
insurance benefi ts. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985 (COBRA) allows employees (under certain circumstanc-
es1) to continue their employers’ group health care plan by paying for 
the policy themselves. COBRA provides insurance at group rates rather 
than individual health insurance rates for up to 18 months after cover-
age would have otherwise ended. More recently, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 protects workers 
when they seek to buy, keep, or switch their health insurance, even 
when workers have serious preexisting medical conditions.
From the perspective of contingent workers, these workplace poli-
cies have two highly problematic eligibility criteria. To be eligible, your 
employer must have insurance that covers 20 or more employees. Also, 
the worker must have been laid off or had her working hours reduced. 
A worker fi red for gross misconduct is ineligible. One of the most seri-
ous limitations of the policy is that it provides no subsidy for those who 
cannot afford the coverage. HIPAA protects only those who can dem-
onstrate health insurance coverage for 18 months without a signifi cant 
interruption, where signifi cant interruption is defi ned as an interruption 
that exceeds 63 days. 
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However, these policies are of little help to contingent workers since 
very few have health insurance coverage provided by their employer. 
We can see in Table 6.1 that most contingent workers and most nonstan-
dard workers do not receive health insurance from their employers.
The low rates of employer-provided health insurance among nearly 
all types of nonstandard employment demonstrates the narrow cast of 
HIPAA. Few workers are helped by a policy providing health insurance 
portability if they do not have health insurance initially. Looking at the 
insurance rates overall, a better picture emerges: workers in nonstan-
dard employment are approximately 12.6 percent less likely to have 
health insurance coverage than regular full-time workers (75.6 percent 
and 88.2 percent, respectively). It is also likely that some of those with 
insurance will fail to meet the continuous coverage requirements of 
HIPAA that ensure portability. The biggest differences are among part-
time and full-time workers. For example, only 18.5 percent of regular 
part-time workers receive health insurance from their employers, while 
69.0 percent of regular full-time workers receive employer-provided 
health insurance.2 
While Table 6.1 indicates that the majority of workers in nonstan-
dard employment do not receive health insurance benefi ts from their 
employers, the majority of nonstandard workers do have some insur-
ance, most likely through a family member or the government. While 
the lack of coverage is not dire for nonstandard workers, spousal cover-
age is costly since employers typically pay only their employees’ por-
tion of the premium. This means greater out-of-pocket expenditures 
for health coverage for workers in nonstandard employment relative to 
regular full-time jobs. 
Pensions
Much like health insurance, pension coverage for nonstandard 
workers is very limited. Table 6.2 shows that workers in full-time em-
ployment are about 3.5 times more likely to receive a pension from their 
employer than are workers in nonstandard jobs (52.8 percent and 16.0 
percent, respectively). The biggest differences in pension coverage are 
based on hours of work. Part-time workers are considerably less likely 
to have pension coverage. This fi nding is consistent with some literature 
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All 84.8 54.3 86.0 50.7 83.8 57.4
All nonstandard arrangements 75.6 13.7 77.7 14.8 73.0 12.4
Full-time
Temporary help agency 46.9 12.8 49.9 11.0 43.0 15.2
On-call/day laborer 69.1 49.0 76.4 39.8 66.3 52.5
Self-employed 82.2 n/a 80.1 n/a 83.0 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 66.8 23.2 65.4 17.6 67.5 25.8
Independent contractor, SEb 73.2 n/a 75.2 n/a 72.5 n/a
Contract company 84.7 58.2 88.8 54.9 83.3 59.4
Regular full-time 88.2 69.0 89.6 66.8 87.0 70.8
Part-time
Temporary help agency 58.3 0.6 70.0 0.9 36.9 0.0
On-call/day laborer 67.0 11.0 69.9 10.6 60.8 12.0
Self-employed 85.6 n/a 88.0 n/a 78.5 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 72.8 10.1 77.8 4.7 64.5 19.0
Independent contractor, SEb 75.1 n/a 81.5 n/a 61.4 n/a
Contract company 81.0 14.9 80.5 12.7 82.0 19.0
Regular part-time 76.6 18.5 78.5 19.4 72.0 15.9
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author. 
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All 60.4 52.8 59.3 52.4 61.5 53.3
All nonstandard arrangements 38.5 16.0 37.7 20.1 39.6 11.1
Full-time
Temporary help agency 24.1 11.3 24.9 10.2 23.0 12.7
On-call/day laborer 51.9 47.7 48.2 40.4 53.3 50.4
Self-employed 51.7 n/a 38.8 n/a 57.0 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 37.2 17.8 36.7 15.8 37.5 18.7
Independent contractor, SEb 44.5 n/a 44.4 n/a 44.5 n/a
Contract company 64.7 56.1 68.7 64.0 63.3 53.2
Regular full-time 68.3 66.2 68.9 66.5 67.9 66.0
Part-time
Temporary help agency 7.7 2.2 11.5 3.3 0.0 0.0
On-call/day laborer 30.9 17.3 33.6 18.7 25.5 14.4
Self-employed 43.9 n/a 42.7 n/a 47.2 n/a
Independent contractor, WSa 32.7 8.8 28.0 4.3 40.1 15.9
Independent contractor, SEb 41.5 n/a 44.9 n/a 34.0 n/a
Contract company 27.5 14.5 28.3 17.1 26.1 9.6
Regular part-time 32.0 25.2 36.1 28.0 21.4 17.1
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author.
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that shows that fi rms use nonstandard work arrangements to offset the 
high benefi ts costs of regular full-time employees (Abraham 1988). 
Policy Evaluation
While these fi ndings for health insurance and pension coverage are 
not surprising given the design of the public policies, there is little evi-
dence that public policy is moving to remedy the lack of coverage for 
workers in nonstandard employment. Temporary employment agencies 
have been sensitive to the criticism that workers are unable to receive 
health insurance; many of these agencies have begun to make it avail-
able to their workers. Despite the increased availability, few workers 
take advantage of the insurance, most likely due to the high costs rela-
tive to their earnings.
The health care and pension systems demonstrate the diffi culty 
public policy has in adequately addressing incomplete markets, that is, 
those markets where there are only limited products available at a wide 
range of prices. From an economic effi ciency standpoint (as defi ned 
above), it is unlikely that the market is effi cient; many uninsured work-
ers with health statuses similar to workers with insurance do not get 
health insurance as a result of where they work. Thus, many workers 
who have relatively low insurance costs go without insurance. From 
a social standpoint health insurance markets are very fl awed. Many 
workers who initially have low-cost insurance go without medical care. 
Some of them get treatment too late, raising overall medical costs and 
potentially decreasing their health outcomes. Since employers who 
do not provide insurance bear only a fraction of the cost of uninsured 
workers, there is little economic incentive to provide insurance. From 
an equity standpoint these markets are very inequitable: workers in os-
tensibly the same work situation receive different compensation. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this policy is security. The 
analysis in Table 6.3 from the matched February/March 2001 Current 
Population Surveys indicates that workers in nonstandard employment 
are much more likely to report “fair” to “poor” health. Involuntary part-
time workers (part-time workers who would prefer full-time work) are 
4.5 times as likely to report diminished health status as regular full-
time workers. This may be due to a variety of factors, not the least of 
which is employee self-selection: fewer healthy workers may choose 
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these forms of employment based on employment fl exibility. However, 
this reduced health status does point to the need for health insurance 
coverage. 
The rationale for government intervention is very strong in this case. 
Socially, the benefi ts of insuring this large group of workers are likely to 
be quite high, and the market has been unable to achieve these improve-
ments on it own. However, it is unlikely that we will see government 
mandate that businesses cover these workers. Their lower health statuses 
imply that they would be increasingly costly to insure. Under these cir-
cumstances government intervention is warranted and necessary. 
SOCIAL INSURANCE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The provision of employer-provided health insurance or pensions 
fails to provide systematic coverage since only workers whose employ-
ers provide benefi ts and who earn enough to afford the benefi ts actually 
receive the coverage. In contrast, social insurance is provided for all 
people who meet certain eligibility requirements. These requirements 
often have a differential impact on workers in nonstandard employment 
arrangements. The most important form of social insurance that directly 
affects employees is unemployment insurance (UI).
Table 6.3  Percentage of Workers Reporting Health Status as “Fair” or 
“Poor,” 2001







SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic fi le 2001; analysis by author 
of matched February/March CPS data.
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Overview of Unemployment Insurance
The UI system in the United States began with the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which provides the primary line of defense against earn-
ings losses when workers become unemployed. For those eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefi ts, the typical state program provides 26 
weeks of benefi ts at approximately 50 percent of the worker’s normal 
wage. Although federal and state statutes have been revised periodi-
cally to increase the level of benefi ts, the basic system created by the act 
has remained the same. The most signifi cant change is that the program 
now covers nearly all employees; therefore, nearly all employees or 
their employers pay unemployment insurance taxes. However, cover-
age does not mean eligibility. Unfortunately, this fi rst line of defense is 
so porous that it leaves many full- and part-time workers uninsured. 
The overall picture of unemployment insurance is one of a declin-
ing share of the full-time workers who lose their jobs receiving UI ben-
efi ts (Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Wenger 2001). In this situa-
tion, workers may have to choose some form of contingent work as an 
earnings substitute for UI benefi ts. While this may be a good strategy 
in a robust economy, during periods of economic malaise even these 
nonstandard jobs will be hard to fi nd. During the current recession, the 
temporary employment sector lost more than 900,000 jobs. Under these 
conditions temporary employment is not likely to provide income secu-
rity to those who have lost jobs in other sectors. 
The situation for workers in nonstandard arrangements is even 
bleaker. Eligibility requirements for hours of work and earnings are 
particularly onerous for contingent workers. Clearly, both these criteria 
are related: as hours decrease we see a commensurate reduction in earn-
ings. Due to the sporadic nature of contingent work, hours and earnings 
are unpredictable, making eligibility diffi cult to establish. 
Determining Eligibility for UI
From the perspective of nonstandard workers, unemployment in-
surance has fi ve major problems related to the determination of eligi-
bility for UI. First, the system is biased toward regular full-time work. 
Workers with low wages and those with fewer than full-time hours may 
have diffi culty qualifying for benefi ts. 
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Second, the system is confusing. A wide array of initial and continu-
ing eligibility requirements create uncertainty about eligibility. Com-
plex payment and benefi t duration formulae confuse workers about 
the potential value of benefi ts. Limited labor market experience only 
compounds the confusion since contingent workers do not have stable 
employment relationships that allow them to share information about 
eligibility and benefi t amounts.
Third, waiting periods prior to eligibility have a disproportionate 
negative impact on low-wage workers, especially those with limited 
resources. Many states have waiting periods for eligibility of one to two 
weeks. Families with limited resources may fi nd a two-week waiting 
period fi nancially unmanageable, choosing instead to return to contin-
gent employment if they can fi nd a job in that sector. 
Fourth, the most diffi cult eligibility rules for a nonstandard worker 
to satisfy may be the rules that deny benefi ts if the worker refuses to 
accept a job offer. Part of the ongoing eligibility requirements in UI 
are the job search requirements. To collect unemployment benefi ts the 
unemployed must continue to search for work. In most states a worker 
who turns down any job offer is no longer eligible to receive benefi ts. 
Federal law does provide some worker protections by prohibiting states 
from denying benefi ts under the following conditions: 
 1) if the job vacancy was the result of a labor dispute; 
 2)  if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered fail 
to meet prevailing standards; 
 3)  if joining a company union or being required not to join a bona 
fi de union is a condition of employment. 
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia stipulate that the 
worker must be available for any type of work to maintain eligibility. 
Ten states require the worker to accept “suitable work,” although this 
has a broad defi nition and changes as the duration of unemployment 
increases. Finally, nine states require the worker to accept work in his 
usual occupation or in jobs for which he is reasonably matched due to 
prior training or experience. The penalties for turning down a job offer 
vary from a reduction in benefi ts to benefi ts being postponed for the 
duration of the unemployment (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
However, the nonstandard labor market is so volatile that part-time 
job offers for work in nonstandard jobs may be a regular facet of this 
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type of employment. For workers who seek to leave contingent em-
ployment and use their unemployment insurance benefi ts to subsidize 
their search for a full-time job, requiring contingent workers to accept 
any position may amount to placing them in a UI eligibility trap from 
which escape to better employment is diffi cult. Thus, this type of eligi-
bility requirement may be particularly diffi cult for a contingent worker 
to satisfy. Turning down a job offer in hopes of landing a better job may 
result in ineligibility.
Finally, a number of states explicitly exclude from eligibility work-
ers who search for part-time work exclusively. These workers are con-
sidered “not available” for full-time work and consequently are not eli-
gible to receive benefi ts (Wenger, McHugh, and Segal 2002). In essence 
these workers’ unavailability is evidenced by their substantial restric-
tions on the conditions of their employment. Consequently, for nonstan-
dard employees, especially part-time workers, eligibility requirements 
may all but eliminate them from collecting UI benefi ts in some states.
Empirical evidence suggests that the eligibility restrictions take a 
much higher toll on contingent and nonstandard employees. Table 6.4 
Table 6.4  Percentage of Workers Satisfying Monetary Eligibility 
Requirements for Unemployment Insurance, 2001




Independent contractor, WSa 63.1
Involuntary part-time 25.7
Voluntary part-time 30.0
Contingent worker type 1 26.3
Contingent worker type 2 30.5
Contingent worker type 3 11.6
Regular full-time 6.1
NOTE: Self-employed and independent contractors not paid by wage or salary are 
omitted since these workers are not covered by the UI system.
a Paid by wage or salary so covered by UI.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic fi le 2001; analysis by author 
of matched February/March CPS data.
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compares the monetary eligibility of contingent, nonstandard, and regu-
lar full-time workers.3 Regular full-time workers are more likely than 
any other group to satisfy the earnings requirements for unemployment 
insurance. The workers least likely to be eligible are the independent 
contractors who are paid a wage or salary.
Previous earnings determine both who is eligible and the amount of 
benefi ts the unemployed receive. Those workers who have lower earn-
ings and fewer hours of work receive smaller benefi t amounts, and are 
likely to receive benefi ts for a shorter period of time. These differences 
in benefi t calculations are not trivial; the maximum weekly benefi t in 
different states varies by hundreds of dollars. Table 6.5 compares the 
maximum weekly benefi ts for the fi ve highest and lowest paying states 
in the United States. 
The difference in maximum weekly benefi ts between Massachu-
setts and Alabama is striking. From a policy perspective we can see 
both sides of the UI debate refl ected in these two states. Lower-thresh-
old earnings requirements increase the likelihood of being eligible but 
often result in low benefi t levels. Conversely, higher benefi t allowances 
usually require higher earnings and/or hours. These higher threshold 
levels may exclude low-wage workers from benefi ts. 
One initially surprising empirical fi nding is that contingent and 
nonstandard workers receive higher benefi t levels than their regular 
full-time counterparts. Considering only those who received UI ben-
efi ts in 1994, nonstandard workers received on average $2,781 (N = 
417) while regular full-time workers only received $2,349 (N = 2435). 
This is likely due to self-selection: only those contingent workers who 
expect higher benefi t payments are likely to apply. Typically these are 
workers with higher incomes and steadier employment such as contract 
workers who are independent contractors in the least volatile employ-
Table 6.5  Maximum Weekly Benefi ts, Lowest and Highest Paying 
States, 2000 ($)
Alabama 190 Massachusetts 477
Mississippi 190 Washington 441
Arizona 205 Pennsylvania 430
South Dakota 224 New Jersey 429
California 230 New York 405
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Labor (2001).
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ment arrangements and paid a wage or salary (see also Kunda, Barley, 
and Evans [2002]). 
Consequently, it appears that there are two groups of contingent em-
ployees who view UI options quite differently: those who are reason-
ably certain of a high benefi t amount are likely to choose to apply for 
UI. However, given the confusing array of eligibility rules and complex 
benefi t formulae, we can speculate that a second group—probably the 
majority of contingent workers—fi nd it easier to seek other contingent 
work rather than apply for benefi ts. Employees in this second group 
fi nd that reentering the contingent labor market is a way of avoiding the 
waiting periods, uncertain benefi t amounts, administrative hassles, and 
the potential social stigma arising from being an unemployed worker. 
Policy Evaluation
The nature of UI usage is changing. The new labor market actors, 
contingent and nonstandard workers, are not using UI in the same way 
that regular full-time workers use the system. Yet despite the reduction 
in use and inapplicability to new work forms, systematic change is un-
likely. States compete among themselves to create favorable business 
conditions to attract employers. They are unlikely to yield to pressure 
from labor groups to systematically extend benefi ts to contingent work-
ers that will increase the cost of labor for employers. When jobs are 
relatively plentiful, this lack of concern for the public policy reform 
may not be problematic. Rather than suffer from the social stigma that 
may occur from UI use, workers will remain productively employed in 
the labor force, even if in less than full-time positions. However, as the 
economic climate shifts toward recession, job availability diminishes 
and contingent employment becomes less of an option. The opportu-
nity to use contingent work as a substitute for UI will be reduced for 
many of these workers. We therefore would expect UI rolls to increase 
because they will be more willing to tolerate the waiting period require-
ments, administrative hassles, and social stigma. 
From a policy perspective, unemployment insurance includes many 
complicated components to analyze. Economic effi ciency, as measured 
by the cost of adding workers in nonstandard arrangements to unem-
ployment insurance, is not likely to be very costly. Wenger (2000) shows 
that the effects of unemployment insurance on the likelihood of workers 
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becoming unemployed are about the same for regular full-time workers 
and workers in nonstandard arrangements. It would appear that the cost 
per person of extending unemployment insurance benefi ts to workers in 
nonstandard arrangements is similar to the current per person costs of 
regular full-time employees.
Unemployment insurance suffers from considerable inequities. 
Particularly vexing is the inequity across states. Identical workers em-
ployed in different states will likely receive different benefi t amounts, 
may have different eligibility outcomes, and may have different weeks 
of eligibility. This inequity is especially problematic to address since 
each state makes its own policy within loose federal guidelines. Creat-
ing a national policy from such a system would be nearly impossible 
since states control almost all of the important aspects of eligibility and 
benefi ts. 
There can be little doubt that workers in nonstandard employment 
arrangements need UI. They are more likely to become unemployed 
and less likely to be eligible for benefi ts. The least stable of these ar-
rangements, such as temporary employment, has both intermittent em-
ployment and low wages. This means that UI eligibility will be more 
diffi cult to attain due to low wages, but spells of unemployment are 
more likely due to sporadic employment. Overall, the current UI system 
is relatively ineffi cient, highly inequitable, and fails to provide security 
for a class of workers with considerable need. The justifi cations for 
government intervention are myriad. Government clearly has a role in 
easing the destructive forces that the market rains on the unemployed. 
Additionally, from a broader economic perspective, UI has a stabilizing 
effect on the economy as a whole (Chimerine, Black, and Coffey 1999). 
However, the real shortcoming of the current unemployment insurance 
program is its lack of modernization to adapt it to the new labor market 
realities in the United States. 
SOCIAL INSURANCE: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
ACT (FMLA)
One of the most recent additions to the U.S. social insurance system 
is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), enacted in 1993. The act 
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was established to “allow employees to balance their work and family 
lives by taking reasonable unpaid leave for certain family and medical 
reasons.” The act also seeks to promote the “economic security of fami-
lies” and “national interests in preserving family integrity.” The FMLA 
accomplishes this by providing eligible employees with up to 12 weeks 
of unpaid, job-protected leave each year. Additionally, the act requires 
employers to continue to provide health benefi ts during the leave.
Unfortunately, for workers in nonstandard employment the FMLA 
provides at best a marginal benefi t to those contingent workers who 
already have the option to sporadically leave the labor force for periods 
of time and receive no pay.4 While the job protections and especially the 
preservation of health insurance may be of some benefi t for contingent 
workers and those in in nonstandard arrangements, eligibility rules and 
low levels of employer-provided insurance provide nearly nonexistent 
benefi ts. 
Factors That Determine Contingent Workers’ Use of FMLA
The FMLA eligibility requirements are much less complex than 
those for the UI system. However, they are far more likely to classify 
contingent and nonstandard workers as ineligible. There are three main 
criteria for FMLA eligibility: the employer must have more than 50 
employees, and the employee must have worked for the employer for 
12 months or more and worked a minimum of 1,250 hours in the previ-
ous 12 months (approximately 31 weeks of work at 40 hours per week). 
These criteria eliminate the majority of contingent workers from eli-
gibility. Part-time workers (those who work year round fewer than 24 
hours per week) or workers who move from job site to job site or who 
have multiple contracts are unlikely to satisfy the eligibility criteria. 
The ability to use the FMLA leave option is determined by the work 
schedules of contingent workers. Not all workers in nonstandard em-
ployment have fl exible schedules. For example, part-time workers may 
have little control over their work schedules. Contract workers may 
only be able to take time away from work between contracts. The self-
employed must schedule time off during the ebb of customer demand. 
Consequently, for workers like these, the FMLA policies could provide 
fl exibility while affording them some job security. However, contingent 
workers typically cannot afford the cost of taking the time off even if 
Ch. 6.indd   184 4/11/2008   11:41:08 AM
Public Policy and Contingent Workers   185
they would benefi t from the protections prescribed in the FMLA. Only 
long-term contractors and “perma-temps” are likely to benefi t from the 
act. The primary benefi t to these two groups is the continued availabil-
ity of employer-provided health insurance during a leave of absence. 
However, because contingent workers are unlikely to receive employer-
provided health insurance, this benefi t will cover few workers, as shown 
previously in Table 6.1.
Thus, the FMLA is unlikely to be an important policy for contingent 
workers since very few will be able to satisfy the eligibility criteria. 
However, the FMLA has created an increased dependence on workers 
in nonstandard jobs since contingent workers are likely to be hired to 
replace regular full-time employees when they use the provisions of the 
act. As of 2000, 98.2 percent of all fi rms reported assigning work to oth-
er employees, while 41.3 percent reported hiring outside temporary-re-
placement workers. The use of temporary workers declined from 1995 
to 2000, but their role in making FMLA successful remains important.
Policy Evaluation
The FMLA does not perform well in terms of our four policy criteria 
of economic effi ciency, equity, security, and liberty. It is clear that the 
policy was essentially formulated for workers in standard jobs where 
leaves of absence normally would require an employee to quit a job. 
Therefore, from an equity perspective, the FMLA program treats ineq-
uitably workers in nonstandard jobs who are excluded from this leave 
option. From the business perspective it would appear that there is little 
additional cost if all employees are allowed to take leave, regardless of 
how many hours of service a worker had rendered in the previous 12 
months. However, it may be harder for employers to manage the loss of 
a full-time employee than a half-time employee. 
Evaluating the FMLA on the criteria of security poses an interesting 
problem. Many nonstandard arrangements offer little fl exibility. Conse-
quently, workers in part-time and contract jobs may have a considerable 
need for the policy. In many cases, workers in these arrangements are 
more likely to meet the hours requirements for eligibility. For the other 
types of work arrangements such as temporary help agency workers, 
independent contractors, and the self-employed, these work forms may 
offer enough fl exibility to be able to accommodate an unpaid leave. 
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After more than 12 years of experience with the FMLA, we have 
not managed to expand coverage, nor have we found a way to provide 
paid leave for those who need to take care of children or sick relatives. 
With an aging U.S. population the demand for this leave option is likely 
to increase. However, without a mechanism for paying for leave, much 
of that demand will go unsatisfi ed. Consequently, the federal govern-
ment is likely to experience increased pressure to intervene. 
Many of the U.S. labor market policies started by providing mod-
est coverage, and over time that coverage has been expanded. This was 
true for UI, the minimum wage, and disability insurance. It remains to 
be seen whether the FMLA follows this path as well.
MINIMUM WAGES
In contrast to the public policies discussed above, federal minimum 
wage legislation instituted with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
in 1938 provides nearly universal coverage. The FLSA establishes stan-
dards for minimum wages, overtime pay, and child labor. States may 
choose to set minimum wages above the federal level. As of January 
2003, 11 states had minimum wage laws that exceeded the federal mini-
mum wage.5 
While the FLSA provides nearly universal coverage, there are two 
notable exceptions: the self-employed and independent contractors. As 
a consequence, nearly one-third of all workers in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements are not covered by minimum wage laws. For those 
who are likely to be covered, such as workers at temporary help fi rms, 
on-call workers, wage and salary independent contractors, and part-
time workers, they are more likely to earn low wages.6 Table 6.6 shows 
mean wages by work arrangement and gender. Average hourly wages 
are lowest for workers in part-time jobs and those who work for tempo-
rary help agencies. Regression analysis that controls for human capital 
characteristics also shows that regression-adjusted wages are lower for 
part-time and temporary workers relative to full-time workers.
The low levels of the minimum wage, the decline of its real pur-
chasing power, and tight labor markets throughout most of the 1990s 
have eroded the effi cacy of the minimum wage.7 Analysis of the Feb-
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Table 6.6  Average Hourly Wages (1999) and Percent Change in Wage Since 1997, by Work Arrangement and Sex
All Women Men
1999 Wage ($) % Change 1999 Wage ($) % Change 1999 Wage ($) % Change
Regular part-time 11.86 12.2 11.81 11.4 12.00 14.7
Temporary help agency 10.84 −2.9 10.00 −1.9 12.01 −2.0
On-call/day laborer 13.19 8.0 12.89 12.8 13.47 4.0
Self-employed 17.68 2.8 14.21 8.3 19.57 0.5
Independent contractor, WSa 17.42 15.6 15.76 22.5 19.10 10.0
Independent contractor, SEb 19.60 −0.8 17.66 −3.6 20.50 0.4
Contract company 19.09 13.7 16.86 15.4 20.15 13.7
Regular full-time 15.83 3.7 13.78 0.7 17.43 5.8
All 15.56 4.3 13.51 2.9 17.37 5.6
a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1997 and 1999; analysis by author. 
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ruary Current Population Survey Contingent Work Supplement from 
1999 indicates that, overall, approximately 10 percent of the labor force 
in 1999 earned less than the federal minimum wage of $5.50 per hour, 
as shown in Table 6.7. However, there were more low-earning workers 
in nonstandard arrangements than in regular full-time jobs. The only 
nonstandard group where the percentage of low earners was below the 
national average was contract workers. These fi ndings may be some-
what misleading since many contract workers are self-employed and 
earn the difference between their revenue and expenditures, regardless 
of the number of hours worked. Consequently many of these workers 
have very low hourly wages. By contrast, workers in nonstandard ar-
rangements who are employed by others are also much more likely to 
be low earners. 
Since some state-set minimum wages are considerably higher than 
the federal minimum wage, they may provide more income security to 
contingent workers. In these states minimum wages ranged between 
$6.15 per hour in Rhode Island and $7.15 in Alaska. This means that 
considerably more workers in contingent employment will be covered 
by the minimum wage legislation in these states. In general, while all 
Table 6.7  Percentage of Workers in Nonstandard Arrangements Earning 
Less Than $5.50 Per Hour, 1999
Regular part-time 22.5
Temporary help agency 5.6
On-call/day laborer 17.1
Self-employed 18.6
Independent contractor, WSa 9.5





a Wage and salary.
b Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, February 1999; analysis by author. 
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states are required to follow federal minimum requirements for the 
FLSA, many have chosen to raise the minimum requirements. This oc-
curs more frequently when the federal government fails to maintain the 
real value of the minimum wage as in the 1980s. 
Policy Evaluation
The heterogeneity of workers across nonstandard employment ar-
rangements means that earnings will vary. The lack of coverage for the 
self-employed and independent contractors means that the minimum 
wage is not a policy with a high score on equity. The economic effi -
ciency considerations for the minimum wage have been written about 
extensively. In general, researchers argue that increases in the minimum 
wage result in a reallocation of labor that is not effi cient. The standard 
claim is that increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment, 
thereby displacing lower-skilled workers. However, research conducted 
using quasi-experimental analyses of state minimum wage increases has 
called into question much of the earlier results.8 There is little reason to 
believe that workers in nonstandard arrangements present a unique case 
in terms of effi ciency. Empirical evidence suggests that the minimum 
wage does not cause meaningful reductions in effi ciency within a rela-
tively narrow range of values. 
As with many of the other policies discussed in this chapter, the 
largest failing of the minimum wage is on the criterion of security. The 
people with the most exposure to the vicissitudes of the market are re-
ceiving neither enough coverage nor the same coverage. Simply stated, 
an increase in minimum wages will have a disproportionate impact on 
part-time workers and temporary help workers. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of minimum wage policy 
from an economic point of view is determining whether the govern-
ment has a legitimate role to play in setting a wage fl oor (liberty). Many 
economic analysts believe that markets are better suited to determining 
wages and that government intervention is unwarranted. This neoclas-
sical or libertarian viewpoint overlooks some of the inequities between 
the parties negotiating a wage. Employers are in a much better bargain-
ing position; they have more resources, more information, and more 
bargaining power. Workers in contingent employment arrangements are 
often at a disadvantage. They have limited bargaining power, largely as 
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a result of many people vying for the same job, and often have limited 
information about the job requirements and hence an appropriate wage. 
In these cases it would seem appropriate to impose a collective outcome 
on the lowest wage earners and employers.
OTHER EMPLOYMENT POLICIES: SAFETY AT THE 
WORK SITE
The discussion in this chapter has shown that many of the employ-
ment policies in the United States were enacted before the large shifts 
to contingent and nonstandard employment occurred. The fundamental 
problem with these policies is that their institutional development took 
place at a time when the contingent workforce was minuscule. As the 
nature of work and U.S. labor markets have changed, public policy has 
increasingly relied on the judicial interpretations of the statutes rather 
than redesigning the policies to keep pace with the changing patterns of 
employment. Many of the statutes that seek to provide other protections 
for workers, such as the reduction of discrimination, protection from 
workplace hazards, and the protection of workers’ rights to fair wages 
and work conditions, also suffer from these same drawbacks. 
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) 
is used here to illustrate the problems inherent in much workplace law, 
these lessons are applicable across a broad range of workplace policies. 
Included among these are the National Labor Relations Act (1935) that 
governs collective bargaining activities, the Fair Labor Standards Act—
Equal Pay Amendment (1963), the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1981, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (1990), as well as a host of federal and state labor and 
employment statutes (Maltby and Yamada 1997). 
The mandate of OSHA is to provide, inasmuch as is possible, a 
safe and healthful work environment for every working man and wom-
an in the United States. The continuing problem for OSHA has been 
determining who is responsible for providing this safe and healthful 
workplace as these new employment relations and forms of work have 
been developing. OSHA places this burden squarely on the employer. 
The employer has the responsibility of providing “a place of employ-
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ment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” (OSHA 1970). 
However, identifying the employer is not always easy. One illustrative 
example is the case of workers employed through a temporary help 
agency who have dual employment relationships: they have one ad-
ministrative employer (the employer of record) such as a temporary 
help agency, and a host employer where the work is actually performed. 
Considerable litigation has resulted around this coemployment issue 
(see Chapter 5 for more details). 
Thus the determination of who employs the worker is the fi rst step 
in determining the party responsible for carrying out the mandates of 
OSHA. The issues can be thorny. The administrative employer such as 
the temporary employment agency has little control over the risk as-
sociated with working at the host employer’s work site, and may have 
only limited knowledge of the potential employment hazards. As a con-
sequence, an information asymmetry is established. This may result in 
workers being unfamiliar with the risks associated with the work. Worse 
yet, the information asymmetry may be exploited by host employers 
who use temporary workers to perform tasks or work under conditions 
that their regular full-time employees would fi nd objectionable.
The problem that has created much concern is employers classify-
ing their workers to evade the requirements of various federal labor 
and employment laws. The legal issues center on the legal defi nitions 
of “an employee” (Carnevale, Jennings, and Eisenmann 1998). While 
numerous criteria have been used, the policy consensus reached by the 
Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations recom-
mends that a single defi nition of employer be developed based on the 
“economic realities” test employed by the courts (Dunlop Commission 
1995). The commission recommends “adopting a single defi nition of 
employer for all workplace laws based on the economic realities of the 
employment relationship.” The commission also advises the National 
Labor Relations Board to develop policies governing joint employment 
relationships to prevent employers from using “contract arrangements 
. . . as a subterfuge for avoiding collective bargaining or evading other 
responsibilities under labor law” (p. 4).
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Policy Evaluation
Perhaps the largest single factor relating to the inadequacy of our 
public policies and the concomitant gaps in coverage for contingent 
workers is multiple employer relationships for these workers. Enforce-
ment of antidiscriminatory or sexual harassment laws is diffi cult under 
these circumstances. The differences in coverage for contingent work-
ers and noncontingent workers is a considerable source of inequity. A 
worker employed by a temporary agency has the same rights as the per-
manent worker, but the mechanism for enforcement is not available. In 
this sense the contingent worker may be treated in a highly inequitable 
manner.
From an economic effi ciency standpoint, there is no reason to be-
lieve that enforcing the health, discrimination, and equal pay rules for 
contingent workers would be more costly than enforcing them for regu-
lar full-time workers. However, from a security standpoint, contingent 
workers are more likely to need the protections since there are oppor-
tunities for employers to take advantage of the information asymme-
tries described earlier. If contingent workers are hired for the purpose 
of “protecting” core employees this would result in an increased role for 
government to ensure security for these workers. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH
Labor market policies in the United States rarely work for contin-
gent and nonstandard workers. The problem is twofold: U.S. employ-
ment policies were not designed to protect contingent and nonstandard 
employees, nor have they kept pace with evolving trends in employ-
ment. The fault lies with the development and evolution of labor market 
policies rather than with the employers and employees. 
Public policies that fail to meet their objectives represent an oppor-
tunity for change. While any revisions will be complex matters of law, 
they should be based on consistent criteria.
 1) Economic effi ciency. Policies should be effi cient in that they 
should not be so onerous as to cause undue hardship to employ-
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ers or eliminate the practice of contingent work. Since there 
is some evidence that both employers and employees benefi t 
from certain types of contingent and nonstandard employment, 
eliminating or curtailing the practice may do more harm than 
good. 
 2) Equity. Policies should be fairly and justly applied to all work-
ers regardless of their employment relationship. To the extent 
possible, coverage should be extended to all employees re-
gardless of occupation, industry, or fi rm size. 
 3) Security. Policies should be targeted to protect the most vul-
nerable workers from the volatility of the market. There is 
considerable evidence that workers in nonstandard arrange-
ments are exposed to more market volatility than other types 
of workers. If this is truly the case, then protecting these work-
ers through social insurance and public policy is important.
 4) Liberty. To the extent that governmental intervention is un-
necessary, markets and private parties should be allowed to 
operate. However, private markets for the provision of disabil-
ity and unemployment insurance have not been forthcoming. 
Markets are not likely to provide many protections to these 
types of workers due to their limited bargaining power relative 
to employers. 
Analysts should avoid understanding liberty as the freedom from 
government intervention. Liberty is a much broader concept, and indi-
vidual preferences may be such that freedom from fear and want out-
weigh freedom from intervention. On occasion, liberty may justify gov-
ernmental intervention in the market rather than thwart it.
Making employment policy more economically effi cient, equitable, 
and just means that both employers and employees understand their 
rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, these rights and responsibili-
ties are universal: they do not depend on the class or kind of employ-
ment. To that end reform should promote economic effi ciency, equity, 
and security for both employers and employees. Therefore, reforms 
should do the following:
• Simplify the eligibility rules for workplace policies such as un-
employment insurance and family and medical leave. Addition-
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ally, reforms should extend these benefi ts to cover all workers 
regardless of the industry or size of employer. 
• Extend unemployment insurance so that it provides health insur-
ance during the period of unemployment. This could be done by 
paying the COBRA copayment to the previous employer.
• Strengthen the public pension system. Since so few workers in 
nonstandard employment receive a pension from their employ-
ers, many more nonstandard workers will have to rely on the 
public pension, Social Security. Nearly all workers are covered 
by Social Security, and 40 quarters of work are enough to qualify 
a worker for benefi ts, but the system must be made fi scally viable 
in the future to guarantee benefi ts for the next generation. 
• Increase the portability of benefi ts. For example, once eligible 
for family medical leave, a worker would remain eligible so long 
as they continued to work—even after they change jobs.9 Ad-
ditionally, increased pension portability would expand coverage 
for workers who move from employer to employer.  
• Provide incentives to business to allay some of the costs associ-
ated with increased coverage and portability.
• Adopt the Dunlop Commission’s recommendation calling for “a 
single defi nition of employer for all workplace laws.”
If enacted, these policy recommendations would provide increased 
coverage for contingent and nonstandard workers by making them 
equivalent, at least in the eyes of the government, to regular full-time 
workers. 
All responsible policy recommendations walk a fi ne line between 
job creation and employee protection. Those concerned with the rights 
of workers believe too little is being done to protect them from the haz-
ards and vicissitudes of the labor market and workplace. Others believe 
that saddling business with the burden of workplace protections reduces 
employment and leads to a more insidious harm, strangling innovation 
and job creation.
It can be argued that the development of contingent and nonstan-
dard employment forms was, and continues to be, a direct response to 
the increasing burden placed on fi rms in the form of new legislation. In 
particular, Autor (2001) has found that limitations on the employment-
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at-will doctrine have resulted in an increased use of temporary help by 
fi rms. (Employment-at-will basically guarantees the employer the right 
to fi re or lay off an employee without cause. In many states the courts 
have curtailed the rights of employers to dismiss workers.) In programs 
such as UI and disability insurance, employer costs are experience-
rated; that is, employers are required to pay premiums based on their 
employees’ claims. More claims result in higher payments. Experience-
rated programs create incentives for fi rms to hire contingent workers 
so that when a worker is laid off or injured, the claim is made against 
the temporary fi rm. If policymakers believe that legislation protecting 
workers from discrimination, unemployment, and workplace hazards 
is important, they must work to close the loopholes that currently exist 
and make the system fl exible enough so that responding to changes in 
employment relations is readily accomplished.
Given the increasing role of nonstandard employment both domes-
tically and internationally, the need for policy changes is likely to be-
come more pressing. The U.S. labor force is becoming older and the so-
ciety is experiencing more inequality. As a result, nonstandard employ-
ment will likely increase over time as workers demand fl exible work 
schedules and employer demand for nonstandard employment services 
increases. 
Directions for Future Research
Scholarship on nonstandard employment to date has focused pri-
marily on identifying nonstandard workers by their characteristics and 
motives for engaging in this type of employment arrangement and why 
this type of employment has grown. Recent research has begun to out-
line the defi ciencies of current public policies in achieving the goal of 
protecting these workers by providing them with the same safety net 
available to regular full-time employees. The next phase of research 
will have to answer the question “What can be done?” Much of the 
challenge of this research is that it must transcend traditional disciplines 
and employ an interdisciplinary approach. Four topics worthy of further 
research are discussed below.
First, the excellent economy of the latter 1990s masked consider-
able inequalities in the U.S. labor force. With the onset of recession in 
2001, health insurance coverage and pension coverage have emerged as 
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areas of concern. As health insurance costs continue to climb, coverage 
for workers in nonstandard employment will become more diffi cult to 
secure. Shoring up the existing Social Security program will become 
more important as the labor force ages. In both these cases research 
should be done that specifi cally focuses on older workers in contingent 
or nonstandard work arrangements. In particular, to what extent was 
reemployment in contingent work necessary for the older retirees who 
lost considerable sums in the equities markets? How will the lack of 
health insurance coverage impact the health of older workers in these 
types of employment?
Second, recessionary periods always refocus attention on the social 
safety—in particular, the unemployment insurance system. The UI sys-
tem is rife with inequality and fails to provide the security that many 
workers need. Policy research about the design of a system that better 
serves a more dynamic and mobile labor force than the one the current 
system was created to serve is much needed.
Third, casual empiricism indicates that few contingent workers are 
eligible for FMLA benefi ts. However, to understand the factors deter-
mining need, the Commission on Family and Medical Leave (1996) 
recommends “additional research should be done to assess the impact 
of family leave policies (both those required by the FMLA and those 
voluntarily provided) on temporary, part-time and contract workers.”
Finally, as this chapter has repeatedly noted, eligibility criteria 
determine who is covered under a specifi c law. Since the Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not cover the self-employed, there is an increas-
ingly large group of workers who are not protected by this act and its 
provision for overtime pay. Other workers are not covered by minimum 
wage laws for similar reasons. One promising area of research is to 
investigate how well the Fair Labor Standards Act is operating. Are 
workers being misclassifi ed as independent contractors to avoid payroll 
taxes? Have workers used nonstandard employment to lower their ex-
perience ratings on social insurance? 
Workers in the United States have come to expect certain charac-
teristics in a “good” job: reasonable wages, health and pension cover-
age, and government policies that protect them from the volatility of 
the market (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Unfortunately, many 
workers in nonstandard employment cannot expect any of these. Wages 
are typically below those of their full-time counterparts, pension and 
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health insurance coverage are limited, and government policies have 
not kept pace with these changes in the workforce. 
The four main criteria used in this analysis—economic effi ciency, 
equity, security, and liberty—demonstrate very clearly the inadequacy 
of much of our safety net for contingent workers. The irony is that many 
of the policies that are inequitable (those that deny coverage to many 
contingent workers while covering the full-time labor force) are also 
those that would provide much-needed security to the contingent work-
force. In essence, the workers who most need protection from the vicis-
situdes of the market are denied coverage. Extending coverage to con-
tingent workers will likely cost more, but not disproportionately, so that 
making most of these extensions in coverage is relatively effi cient. 
It is the issue of liberty around which much of the debate centers. 
The legitimate role of government to intervene is hotly contested and 
will be the battleground for this issue for years to come. Future re-
search on expanding the safety net for those in need will help determine 
how the characteristics of “good jobs” can be extended to nonstandard 
employment. But research alone will not make political decisions to 
extend the legitimate role of government. A deeper understanding of 
government’s role coupled with political pressure remains the catalyst 
for that type of change. 
Notes
  1. Typically, an employer must have at least 20 employees and offer a health insur-
ance plan. COBRA allows continued coverage only for those who would be los-
ing coverage for certain reasons such as the loss of a job, the reduction in hours 
of work, the death or divorce of a parent or spouse, or the change in status as 
dependent. 
  2. For a more general discussion of the role of professional part-time employees, 
see Lawrence and Corwin (2003).
  3. Monetary eligibility is determined by state requirements. It is a measure of 
whether a worker earned enough to qualify for the state’s minimum benefi t.
  4. While the FMLA is not likely to provide much benefi t to workers in contin-
gent and nonstandard employment arrangements, this should not be considered a 
wholesale criticism of the policy. There is considerable evidence that the policy 
provides real benefi ts to those 50 percent of full-time workers covered by the 
policy in small fi rms and the 95 percent of full-time workers covered by the 
policy in large fi rms (Waldfogel 1999). However, the use of the FMLA leave 
has been fairly modest. About 1.2 percent of all employees took leave under 
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the provisions of the FMLA between its enactment and 1999 (see Cantor et al. 
2001). Those who needed leave but did not take leave represent 3.4 percent of the 
sample. When asked, employees consistently remark that this low level of usage 
is brought about by the lack of paid leave. Of those who needed leave for a birth 
or illness in the family, fully 63.9 percent of respondents claimed they “cannot 
afford the accompanying loss of wages” (Cantor et al. 2001). 
 5. Alaska ($7.15); California ($6.75); Connecticut ($7.10); Delaware ($6.15); Ha-
waii ($6.25); Maine ($6.25); Massachusetts ($6.75); Oregon ($6.90); Rhode Is-
land ($6.15); Vermont ($6.25); Washington ($7.01).
 6. Wage and salary independent contractors are paid on a regular basis with a wage 
or salary instead of by the task.
 7. From 1981 until 1990, the nominal value of the minimum wage remained con-
stant at $3.35, while its real value shrank due to infl ation. Phased increases in 
the minimum wage from 1995 through 1997 have done little to restore it to its 
pre-1980 levels. 
 8. There is considerable evidence that the employment disincentives have been 
overstated by previous research (see, for example, Card and Kreuger 1995).
 9. The only way to reform these types of policies is to generalize and make portable 
a fund for both UI and FMLA. In this way workers make contributions to the UI 
and FMLA funds. Once suffi cient payments have been made, a worker may draw 
them down. This eliminates eligibility requirements and long-term employment 
relationships necessary for eligibility without eliminating the work requirement 
of the policy.
References
Abraham, K. 1988. “Flexible Staffi ng Arrangements and Employers’ Short-
Term Adjustment Strategies.” In Employment, Unemployment and Labor 
Utilization, R.A. Hart, ed. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, pp. 288–311.
Autor, D. 2001. “Outsourcing at Will: Unjust Dismissal Doctrine and the 
Growth of Temporary Help Employment.” JCPR working paper 153. Chi-
cago: Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Pov-
erty Research. 
Blank, R., and D. Card. 1991. “Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Un-
employment: Is There an Explanation?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
106(4): 1157–1189.
Cantor, D., J. Waldfogel, J. Kerwin, M. Wright, K. Levin, J. Rauch, T. Hagerty, 
and M. Kudela. 2001. Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers: 
Family and Medical Leave Surveys, 2000 Update. Rockville, MD: Westat. 
Card, D., and A. Kreuger. 1995. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics 
of the Minimum Wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carnevale, A., L. Jennings, and J. Eisenmann. 1998. “Contingent Workers and 
Ch. 6.indd   198 4/11/2008   11:41:11 AM
Public Policy and Contingent Workers   199
Employment Law.” In Contingent Work, K. Barker and K. Christensen, eds. 
Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, pp. 281–305.  
Chimerine, L., T. Black, and L. Coffey. 1999. “Unemployment Insurance as 
an Automatic Stabilizer: Evidence of Effectiveness over Three Decades.” 
Unemployment insurance occasional paper 99-8. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor.
Commission on Family and Medical Leave. 1996. A Workable Balance: Re-
port to Congress on Family Medical Leave Policies. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau.
Dunlop Commission. 1995. Fact Finding Report: Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Offi ce.
duRivage, V., F. Carré, and C. Tilley. 1998. “Making Labor Law Work for 
Part-Time and Contingent Workers.” In Contingent Work: American Em-
ployment Relations in Transition, K. Barker and K. Christensen, eds. Ithaca, 
NY: ILR Press, pp. 263–280.
Gonos, G. 1997. “The Contest over ‘Employer’ Status in the Postwar United 
States: The Case of Temporary Help Firms.” Law and Society Review 31(1): 
81–110. 
Haber, W., and M. Murray. 1966. Unemployment Insurance in the American 
Economy: An Historical Review and Analysis. Homewood, IL: Richard D. 
Irwin.
Kalleberg, Arne L., Barbara F. Reskin, and Ken Hudson. 2000. “Bad Jobs in 
America: Standard and Nonstandard Employment Relations and Job Qual-
ity in the United States.” American Sociological Review 65(2): 256–278.
Kunda, G., S. Barley, and J. Evans. 2002. “Why Do Contractors Contract? The 
Experience of Highly Skilled Technical Professionals in a Contingent Labor 
Market.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55(2): 234–261.
Lawrence, T., and V. Corwin. 2003. “Being There: The Acceptance and Mar-
ginalization of Part-Time Professional Employees.” Journal of Organiza-
tional Behavior 24(1): 1–21.
Maltby, L., and D. Yamada. 1997. “Beyond ‘Economic Realities’: The Case 
for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Inde-
pendent Contractors.” Boston College Law Review 38(2): 239–274.
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970).
Parker, R. 1994. Flesh Peddlers and Warm Bodies: The Temporary Help In-
dustry and Its Workers. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Stone, D. 1988. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. New York: Harper Col-
lins.
U.S. Department of Labor. Employment and Training Administration. 1996. 
“Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.” Washington, DC: 
Ch. 6.indd   199 4/11/2008   11:41:11 AM
200   Wenger
U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division, January 7.
———. 2001. “Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.” Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division, 
January 7.
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation, 97 F.3d 1187 (Ninth Cir. 1995).
Vroman, W. 1991. “The Decline in Unemployment Insurance Claims Activity 
in the 1980s.” Unemployment insurance occasional paper 91-2. Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administra-
tion.
Waldfogel, J. 1999. “Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Sur-
veys.” Monthly Labor Review 124(9): 17–23. 
Wenger, J. 2000. “Falling through the Cracks: Unemployment Insurance in an 
Era of Contingent Work.” PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina. 
———. 2001. “Divided We Fall.” Briefi ng paper no. 110. Washington, DC: 
Economic Policy Institute.
Wenger, J., R. McHugh, and N. Segal. 2002. “Part-Time Work, Inadequate 
Unemployment Benefi ts.” Indicators—The Journal of Social Health 1(4): 
99–112. 
Ch. 6.indd   200 4/11/2008   11:41:11 AM
The Shadow Workforce
Perspectives on Contingent 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Gleason.indb   3 11/13/2006   9:06:40 AM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The shadow workforce : perspectives on contingent work in the United States, Japan, 
and Europe / Sandra E. Gleason, editor.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibligraphical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-288-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-288-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-289-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-289-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Temporary employment—United States. 2. Temporary employment—Japan. 
3. Temporary employment—Europe. 4. Part-time employment—United States. 
5. Part-time employment—Japan. 6. Part-time employment—Europe. 7. Contracting 
out—United States. 8. Contracting out—Japan. 9. Contracting out—Europe. 




W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the author. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Gleason.indb   4 11/13/2006   9:06:40 AM
